Optimal Contracting With Endogenous Social Norms by Fischer, Paul E & Huddart, Steven
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Accounting Papers Wharton Faculty Research
9-4-2008
Optimal Contracting With Endogenous Social
Norms
Paul E. Fischer
University of Pennsylvania
Steven Huddart
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/accounting_papers
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Economics Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/accounting_papers/25
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fischer, P. E., & Huddart, S. (2008). Optimal Contracting With Endogenous Social Norms. American Economic Review, 98 (4),
1459-1475. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.4.1459
Optimal Contracting With Endogenous Social Norms
Abstract
Research in sociology and ethics suggests that individuals adhere to social norms of behavior established by
their peers. Within an agency framework, we model endogenous social norms by assuming that each agent’s
cost of implementing an action depends on the social norm for that action, defined to be the average level of
that action chosen by the agent’s peer group. We show how endogenous social norms alter the effectiveness of
monetary incentives, determine whether it is optimal to group agents in a single or two separate organizations,
and may give rise to a costly adverse selection problem when agents' sensitivities to social norms are
unobservable.
Disciplines
Accounting | Economics | Social and Behavioral Sciences
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/accounting_papers/25
1459
American Economic Review 2008, 98:4, 1459–1475
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.98.4.1459
Research in social psychology suggests that social norms arise and influence individual behav-
ior because individuals have innate preferences to conform to the behavior of their peers. When 
one’s peers are other members of the same organization, such as a firm or a profession, this 
research suggests that the behavior of individuals in an organization determines the social norms 
for the organization which, in turn, influence individual behavior. It follows from this interplay 
between individual behavior and social norms that social norms are endogenous and ultimately 
determined by exogenous design choices, such as the organization’s incentive contracts, bound-
aries, and membership. 
To assess how social norms and organizational design interact, we analyze a principal-agent 
model in which a principal contracts with a continuum of agents. In our main model, each agent 
influences the performance measure that determines his compensation through two action 
choices, called the desirable action choice and the undesirable action choice. The desirable action 
yields some benefit to the principal, while the undesirable action imposes a cost on the principal. 
For example, the desirable action may represent the agent’s productive effort and the undesirable 
action may represent detrimental earnings management activities undertaken by the agent. We 
 In the social psychology literature, Lawrence Kohlberg (984) develops a framework of moral development in 
which individuals prefer to conform to norms established by their peers. Subsequent studies have developed psycho-
metric instruments that measure this preference and conclude that the majority of individuals within professional 
organizations of adults prefer to conform, although the strength of this preference varies from individual to individual. 
A related construct in psychology is the locus of control developed by Julian B. Rotter (966).
 An extensive accounting literature considers accounting (e.g., bookkeeping) manipulation. See, for example, 
Ronald A. Dye (988), Paul E. Fischer and Robert E. Verrecchia (000), or the survey of empirical evidence discussed 
in Thomas D. Fields, Thomas Z. Lys, and Linda Vincent (00). In addition, there is extensive evidence that managers 
make real decisions (e.g., channel stuffing or foregoing research and development expenditures) to manipulate near-
term performance measures. See, for example, Jeremy C. Stein (989) or David Hirshleifer (993) or, for some empiri-
cal evidence, Paul E. Oyer (998) and Merle Erickson, Michelle Hanlon, and Edward L. Maydew (004).
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assume a separate norm for each action, where the norm for an action affects the cost of that 
action to every agent (e.g., by inducing feelings of satisfaction or guilt) and thereby influences 
every agent’s action choice. To reflect behaviors described in the sociology literature, the social 
norm ultimately causes each agent to choose a higher action level when his peers choose a higher 
action level.3
We incorporate both desirable and undesirable actions, and a corresponding norm for each, in 
our analysis because both types of actions and norms appear to be economically relevant. In the 
business realm, for example, shortcomings in corporate culture have been attributed not simply 
to the demise of social norms encouraging desirable actions, such as diligent effort, but also to 
the erosion of social norms that thwart undesirable actions, especially the manipulation of finan-
cial reports.4 Furthermore, outside the business realm, recent empirical studies provide evidence 
that norms for both types of actions affect individual choices. For example, Raymond Fisman 
and Edward Miguel (006) study the differing propensities of Nigerian and Norwegian diplomats 
posted to New York City to accumulate unpaid parking tickets—an undesirable action—and 
conclude that social norms related to corruption are significant and persistent because diplomats 
behave like others in their home countries. As another example, E. Han Kim, Adair Morse, and 
Luigi Zingales (006) report that academics’ research productivity—a desirable action—is influ-
enced by the cultural norm of the department that houses them.
Our analysis suggests that norms for desirable and undesirable actions have different impli-
cations for organization design. For example, the presence of a norm for desirable action mul-
tiplies the benefits of financial incentives, while the presence of a norm for undesirable action 
reduces the benefits. In addition, agents’ relative sensitivities to each type of norm determines 
whether it is beneficial to split an organization apart to foster different norms in each part. As a 
final example, unobservable individual differences in sensitivity to social norms create a costly 
adverse selection problem when the differences pertain to social norms for undesirable actions, 
but not when the differences pertain to social norms for desirable actions.
Other papers have considered how nonmonetary incentives, such as social norms, have conse-
quences for the returns to financial incentives. In a setting with a single agent, Roland Bénabou 
and Jean Tirole (003) formalize the notion that monetary incentives can crowd out incentives 
provided by intrinsic factors. Relatedly, experimental and field study work in a nonbusiness 
setting by Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini (000a, b) supports the notion that intrinsic factors 
can undermine the effectiveness of financial incentives. They find that introducing financial 
incentives in a nonbusiness setting can lead to less of a desirable action (correct answers to test 
questions) and more of an undesirable action (the tardy collection of children from a day care 
center), respectively. Their evidence of important interactions between extrinsic (i.e., monetary) 
and intrinsic (e.g., a social norm) incentives suggests that norms, in addition to standard compen-
sation mechanisms, merit study.
In an agency study of team production incorporating a norm, Steffen Huck, Dorothea Kübler, 
and Jörgen Weibull (006) show that strong monetary incentives tied to aggregate team pro-
duction can rule out Pareto-preferred equilibria that are attainable if incentives are weak and 
norms are strong. In another agency study, Dirk Sliwka (007) shows that firms may forego high- 
powered incentive contracts because they attract agents who respond solely to the incentives 
3 Models of reciprocation have interdependent preferences, which is a feature analogous to our social norm. Ernst 
Fehr and Armin Falk (00) distinguish between two human social desires that interact with economic incentives: the 
desire for social approval and the desire to reciprocate—see, e.g., Gary Bolton and Axel Ockenfels (000) and Gary 
Charness and Matthew Rabin (00), who examine how notions of equity and fairness influence behavior. These mod-
els do not address social norms with respect to unobservable acts, which is the focus of our study.
4 See, for example, the comments of Arthur Levitt (998), who is a former Securities and Exchange Commission 
Chairman.
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which, in turn, undermines the behavior of agents employed by that firm who conform to the 
behavior of others. These agency studies do not consider how norms determine organizational 
boundaries or membership.
Because we use a two-action framework, this study relates to the multitask agency literature 
initiated by Bengt Holmström and Paul Milgrom (99). The model considered here differs from 
the models in that literature because (a) social norms induce interdependence in the agents’ 
utility functions and (b) the undesirable action is detrimental to the principal even though it 
favorably influences the performance measure. Because of this latter feature, our study relates 
to work by Canice Prendergast (999), who analyzes how counterproductive influence activities 
can improve subjective evaluation measures.
Finally, some tax and welfare policy research also considers the role of norms. The tax com-
pliance studies of Jon S. Davis, Gary Hecht, and Jon D. Perkins (003) and Joel Slemrod (004) 
suggest that social norms are important to tax compliance. In a related vein, N. Soren Blomquist 
(993) and Assar Lindbeck, Sten Nyberg, and Weibull (999) consider the effects of tax and 
welfare policy, respectively, on labor supply when norms influence behavior.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I presents a single (desirable) action model with a 
single social norm, which introduces and motivates the intuition for the two-action two-norm 
model presented in Section II. Section III characterizes the cost of implementing a particular 
set of desirable actions, which is necessary for the analyses in Sections IV and V. Section IV 
considers how changing organization boundaries, which alters the social norms faced by agents, 
affects the cost of implementing a set of actions. Section V identifies the behavioral traits that are 
preferred within particular organizations and considers whether contracts exist that attract only 
the agents with the desired traits. Section VI concludes.
I.  Single Action Model
Consider an agency model in which a principal employs a continuum of risk-neutral agents, 
each of whom must undertake a single task. The agents are indexed by a compact set I having 
strictly positive measure. The agents have a common reservation level of expected utility, v. After 
contracts are signed, each agent i [ I chooses a level of some desirable action, ai $ 0, which 
the principal cannot observe.
Contracts are linear, so that agent i’s compensation is wi 1 bi ri , where wi [ R and bi . 0 are 
the contract parameters, and ri is a stochastic report that determines agent i’s compensation. The 
mean of ri is h 1ai 2 , where h9 . 0, h0 # 0, h9 1x 2 approaches infinity as x approaches 0; and h9 1x 2 
approaches 0 as x approaches infinity. Attention is restricted to linear contracts because these 
contracts make intuitive the interplay between the power of incentives, represented by the bi’s, 
and social norms. Furthermore, linear contracts are efficient in this setting.6
Given contract 5wi, bi6, agent i chooses ai to maximize
()  z 1ai 2 K wi 1 bi h 1ai 2 2 f 1ai 2 Nai 2 ,
where f is a cost function with continuous derivatives defined over the real line, and f 9 . 0 and 
f 0 . 0. Finally, agent i’s cost, f 1ai 2 Nai 2 , is influenced by a norm parameter, Nai , which affects 
 Restricting attention to cases where bi is strictly positive, which is necessary and sufficient for agent i to choose an 
interior level of action, simplifies the proofs without affecting the formal results.
6 If the density function for ri as a function of ai can be written in the form g 1ri, ai 2 , then restricting attention to 
linear contracts is without loss of generality because linear contracts are as efficient as any other contract that induces 
any interior set of desirable actions by the agents of an organization.
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i’s total and marginal costs of ai. Formally, a higher value for the norm reduces the marginal cost 
of ai because d 
f 1ai 2 Nai 2 /dai dNai 5 2f 0 , 0.
Including the norm Nai  in the cost function for the action captures the idea that, in addition to 
any physical or cognitive cost, action choices have an emotional cost that is determined in part 
by norms of behavior. For example, an individual may have a personal ethic that supports hard 
work, which we term a personal norm. In addition, an individual may be part of an organization 
with a cultural ethic that supports hard work with feelings of satisfaction, which we term a social 
norm. A higher norm of either type inclines an individual to work harder for a given level of 
financial incentives. Accordingly, we assume that individual i’s norm, Nai, is a weighted average 
of agent i’s personal norm, Ai [ R, and a common social norm for the action, Sa, which is the 
per-capita average level of the actions of other agents in i’s organization. Formally, the norm for 
agent i in an organization I is
()  Nai  K 1 2 ai 2 Ai 1 ai Sa, where
 eI ai di(3) Sa K    . eI di
Parameter ai [ 30, a– 4 , where 0 # a– , , represents the extent to which agent i is influenced by 
the behavior of others in his organization through the social norm, and ai . 0 implies that i 
chooses a higher ai in response to an increase in the average action of his peers.
The payoff that the principal derives from a given supply of the action is unspecified because 
our primary focus is on the minimum cost of implementing the desirable action. Nonetheless, the 
principal cares about the agents’ actions because they generate some valuable noncontractible 
payoff. The principal uses the report only as a source of information (i.e., the report has no intrin-
sic value). Further, analogous to models of atomistic agents where each agent is a price taker, 
observe that agents are “norm takers” because each agent’s action choice has no measurable 
effect on the social norm, Sa. Finally, each agent correctly anticipates the social norm, Sa, that 
actually prevails in his organization, which is analogous to a rational expectations assumption.7
A. post-Contracting Equilibrium
A post-contracting equilibrium for contract parameters 5wi, bi6 i [ I is a set of actions, 5ai6 i [ I, 
such that for each i, ai maximizes objective () given 5wi, bi6 and Sa , and Sa satisfies equation (3) 
given 5ai6 i [ I. To prove the existence and uniqueness of a post-contracting equilibrium, we first 
derive each agent’s optimal action choice given the agent’s contract and the social norm. The 
mathematical properties of agent i ’s objective imply that the first-order condition completely 
characterizes i ’s action choice:
(4) z9 1ai 2 5 bi h9 1ai 2 2 f 9 1ai 2 1 2 ai 2 Ai 2 ai Sa 2 5 0.
By applying the implicit function rule to this first-order condition, ai can be written as an implicit 
function of Sa, ai 1Sa 2 , where:
 0ai 1Sa 2 ai f  0 1ai – 1 2 ai 2 Ai 2 ai Sa 2 2()     5                   [ 30, ai 2 . 0Sa 2bih0 1ai 2 1 f  0 1ai 2 1 2 ai 2 Ai 2 ai Sa 2
7 Note that norms influence behavior by altering each agent’s cost of the desirable action. Norms also may influence 
agent behavior in ways we do not model. For example, an agent may bear a cost when affiliated with an organization 
with low social norms because he is treated poorly by his colleagues. We thank a referee for suggesting this point.
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To complete the proof, we establish that there is a unique Sa such that
 eI ai 1Sa 2di(6) Sa 2       5 0. eI di
The left-hand side of equation (6) evaluated at Sa 5 0 is strictly negative and increases mono-
tonically and continuously in Sa at a rate greater than  2 a
– . 0. It follows that there is a unique 
value of Sa, which is positive and finite, that satisfies equation (6). Hence, we have the following 
lemma.
LEMMA : for any set of contracts, 5wi, bi6 i [ I for organization I, there exists a unique post-
contracting equilibrium, 5ai6 i [ I.
B. multiplier Effects
To gain some insight into the role played by the social norm, we present comparative statics in a 
setting where all agents have identical contracts and preferences so that bi 5 b, Ai 5 A, and ai 5 a 
for all i [ I. As a result, ai 5 a for i [ I. Analysis of the first-order condition (4) leads to
 da 0z9 1a 2/0y dSa a f  0 1a 2 Na 2(7)    5               1               ,
 dy 2bh0 1a 2 1 1 2 a 2 f  0 1a 2 Na 2 dy 2bh0 1a 2 1 f  0 1a 2 Na 2
where y is b, A, or a and dSa/dy is the change in the post contracting equilibrium social norm 
implied by (6). The first term on the right-hand side of equation (7), which is proportional to 
0z9 1a 2/0y, is the direct effect of the parameter change on agents’ actions. The second term, which 
is proportional to dSa/dy, captures the impact of the change in the norm attributable to the change 
in the exogenous parameter. Furthermore, because a 5 Sa, this indirect effect is of the same sign 
as the direct effect. Assuming agents are sensitive to the social norm 1 i.e., a . 02 , the indirect 
effect multiplies the direct effect. For example, if the direct effect causes each agent to work a 
bit harder, the additional hard work favorably affects the social norm which, in turn, causes each 
agent to work harder still. Formally, we have the following corollary. 
COROLLARY : Assume identical agents with identical contracts. the agents’ actions are 
increasing in the power of incentives, da/db . 0, and increasing in their personal norm, da/dA 
. 0. Whether the agents’ actions are increasing or decreasing in the agents’ sensitivities to the 
social norm depends on whether the social norm is higher or lower than the personal norm: 
da/da . 0 if Sa . A, and da/da , 0 if Sa , A.
Consider, first, changes in the incentive parameter b. The direct effect is positive—greater 
incentives induce more of the desirable action—and this effect is reinforced by the concomi-
tant increase in the social norm. An increase in the agents’ respective personal norms, A, also 
increases the desirable action. Again, because the increased personal norm translates into more 
desirable action, the social norm also increases, which induces yet higher effort. Finally, consider 
changes in the sensitivity to the social norm. If the social norm, Sa, is higher (lower) than the 
personal norm for each agent, A, an increase in  agents’ sensitivity to the social norm increases 
(decreases) the total norm, Na, which provides a direct incentive to take a higher action, a. This 
direct effect is multiplied because the social norm also increases (decreases), which induces even 
more (less) desirable action. In summary, in the single-action setting, the social norm multiplies 
the effect on a of any change in the exogenous parameters.
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II.  Desirable and Undesirable Action Choices with Two Norms
Norms influence desirable actions, but they may also influence undesirable actions. For 
example, as discussed in the introduction, employees can engage in costly earnings manage-
ment activities that improve reported performance but ultimately reduce firm value. To introduce 
norms that influence undesirable actions, we extend the base model to include a second action 
choice with its own norm. In the main model, each agent i chooses two unobservable actions that 
affect the principal’s welfare, a desirable action, ai $ 0, and an undesirable action, ui $ 0. The 
undesirable action, ui, imposes a cost on the principal of ki ui where ki . 0. Agent i’s compensa-
tion is again restricted to be linear in a report, ri; however, the mean of ri is now h 1ai 1 ui 2 . As 
a consequence, the report does not allow the principal to distinguish ai from ui. In addition, the 
agent’s objective includes a cost associated with the undesirable action:
(8)  z 1ai, ui 2 K wi 1 bih 1ai 1 ui 2 2 f 1ai 2 Nai 2 2 f 1ui 1 Nui 2 .
Consistent with the notion that a higher level of the norm for the undesirable action should 
discourage the agent from taking that action, a higher value for the norm increases the marginal 
cost of ui 1 i.e., 0 f 1ui 1 Nui 2/0ui0Nui 5 f  0 . 02 .
The norm associated with the undesirable action is defined in a manner analogous to the norm 
for the desirable action:
(9) Nui K 1 2 mi 2 ui 1 mi Su, where
 eI ui di(0) Su K 2     eI di
is the social norm for the undesirable action, ui is agent i ’s personal norm for the undesirable 
action, and mi [ 30, m– 4 , where 0 # m– , , captures the extent to which agent i is influenced by 
the undesirable behavior of others in the organization. In contrast to the desirable action social 
norm specification in (3), Su is defined so that the undesirable action norm for an agent is reduced 
when other agents engage in more of that action. This assumption, coupled with the assumption 
that a higher norm for undesirable action increases an agent’s personal cost of that action, implies 
that an agent engages in more of the undesirable action when others in the organization engage 
in more of that action.
A. post-Contracting Equilibrium
A post-contracting equilibrium for an organization of agents I, who have contracts 5wi, bi6 i [ I, 
is defined as a set of actions, 5ai, ui6 i [ I, such that: (a) each agent’s action choices maximize 
objective (8) given 5wi, bi6 i [ I; and (b) Sa and Su satisfy equations (3) and (0) given 5ai, ui6 i [ I. 
As in the single-action model, the proof that there exists a unique post-contracting equilibrium 
begins by characterizing each agent’s action choices as a function of the contract parameters 
and the social norms. The proof is completed by demonstrating that there exists a unique pair 
of social norms, Sa and Su, that satisfy (3) and (0). This and all subsequent proofs are in a Web 
Appendix (available at http://www.aeaweb.og/articles.php?doi=0.7/aer.98.4.49).
LEMMA : for any set of contracts, 5wi, bi6 i [ I for organization I, there exists a unique post-
 contracting equilibrium, 5ai, ui6 i [ I. If all agent choices are interior, then ai 2 Nai 5 ui 1 Nui 
for all i.
The observation that ai 2 Nai 5 ui 1 Nui when the agents’ choices are interior implies that 
the action mix selected by agent i shifts toward the desirable action as either his norm for the 
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 desirable action, Nai , increases or his norm for the undesirable action, Nui , increases. A higher 
norm for the desirable action reduces the marginal cost of that action to the agent. A higher norm 
for the undesirable action increases the marginal cost of that action, which induces the agent to 
supply more of the desirable action.
B. multiplier Effects
In the single action setting, we demonstrated that the social norm for the desirable action mul-
tiplies the impact of changes in exogenous parameters on the desirable action choice. With two 
actions and a social norm for each, there are two multiplier effects, which can have offsetting 
effects on an agent’s desirable action choice. To illustrate, we again employ a setting with identi-
cal contracts and agents: bi 5 b, Ai 5 A, ui 5 u, ai 5 a, and mi 5 m for i [ I. As a result, ai 5 
a and ui 5 u for i [ I. Throughout, interior choices for both actions are assumed.
Consider the impact of an increase in the power of incentives, b. Holding constant the social 
norms, the direct effect of the increase in b on the desirable and undesirable action choice leads 
to an increase in both actions. The increase in the desirable action choice causes an increase in 
the desirable action social norm, which yields the same multiplier effect as in the single action 
setting by making the desirable action less costly to each agent. The increase in the undesirable 
action choice causes a decrease in the undesirable action social norm, which makes the undesir-
able action less costly as well. If the two multipliers are unequal, the action mix shifts toward 
the action choice with the larger multiplier. Hence, if the multiplier on the undesirable action is 
larger, which occurs when m is large, the impact of the change in b on the desirable action is 
mitigated by the social norm for the undesirable action. It turns out that this effect is never large 
enough to dominate the direct effect, although the effect of an increase in b on the desirable 
action approaches zero as the agents’ sensitivity to the social norm for the undesirable action, m, 
approaches its upper bound, one.
When the personal norm for either the desirable or the undesirable action increases, the direct 
effect of the change causes the action mix to shift toward the desirable action. The change in 
the mix causes both social norms to increase, implying that each social norm creates a positive 
multiplier effect on the desirable action choices. If the social norm is higher than the personal 
norm 1e.g., Sa . A or Su . u2 , then an increase in the sensitivity to either social norm causes the 
desirable action to increase. If the social norm is lower than the personal norm, then an increase 
in the sensitivity to either social norm causes the undesirable action to decrease. The following 
corollary summarizes these observations.
COROLLARY : Assume identical agents with identical contracts in the setting where the 
agents choose desirable and undesirable actions, and these actions are interior. the desirable 
and undesirable action choices for each agent are increasing in the power of incentives: da/db 
. 0 and du/db . 0. the desirable action choice is increasing and the undesirable action choice 
is decreasing in either personal norm: da/dA . 0, da/du . 0, du/dA , 0, and du/du , 0. 
Whether the desirable and undesirable actions are increasing or decreasing in the agents’ sen-
sitivities to the social norms depends on whether the social norm is higher or lower than the 
personal norm: (i) da/da . 0 and du/da , 0 if Sa . A, (ii) da/da , 0 and du/da . 0 if Sa, A, 
(iii) da/dm . 0 and du/dm , 0 if Su . u, and (iv) da/dm , 0 and du/dm . 0 if Su , u.
III.  Per-Capita Implementation Costs
The post-contracting equilibrium allows us to determine the minimum cost to implement a 
specific set of desirable actions. The cost functions prove useful in analyzing how organizations 
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can be structured to exploit endogenous social norms and how agents with differing behavioral 
traits (e.g., one’s sensitivity to a social norm) can be allocated to organizations so as to minimize 
implementation costs. We develop the case of the desirable and undesirable actions. The results 
in the single-action setting are easily inferred from the more general setting.
An optimal contract set for implementing 5ai6 i [ I is a 5wi, bi6 i [ I that minimizes the sum of 
the per-capita expected compensation and undesirable action costs,
 eI wi 1 bi h 1ai 1 ui 2 1 ki ui di              ,	 eI di
subject to each agent attaining his reservation level of expected utility, z 1ai , ui 2 $ v; ai and ui 
maximize z 1ai , ui 2 for each i; and, the endogenous social norms satisfy conditions (3) and (0). 
The reservation constraint for each agent i is always binding, so the principal’s objective can 
be rewritten as a function of the desirable actions, 5ai6 i [ I, and the induced set of undesirable 
actions, 5ui6 i [ I:
 eI 3v 1 f 1ai 2 Nai 2 1 f 1ui 1 Nui 2 1 ki ui 4 di()                     .
 eI di
The restated objective function () identifies the components of the cost to the principal of 
inducing a given level of the desirable action. The desirable action cost to the principal is simply 
the cost to the agent, f 1ai 2 Nai 2 . In contrast, the undesirable action imposes costs on the prin-
cipal from two sources. First, there is the cost that arises from putting the agents into a situation 
where they are induced to take undesirable actions, f 1ui 1 Nui 2 . This cost of undertaking ui is 
borne directly by agent i and indirectly by the principal, who pays agent i’s wages. Second, there 
is the direct cost of the undesirable action to the principal, ki ui.
If both ai and ui are strictly positive for i [ I, which we assume for the remainder of the paper, 
then the principal’s problem can be exploited to characterize the minimum cost of implementing 5ai6 i[I as a function of those actions, as well as the exogenous variables. In particular, recall 
from Lemma  that ai 2 Nai  5 ui 1 Nui  for each agent. It follows that the cost function () can 
be written
 eI v 1  f 1ai 2 Nai 2 1 ki 1ai 2 Nai  2 Nui 2 di()                     ,
 eI di
where Nai 5 1 2 ai 2 Ai 1 ai Sa,  Nui 5 1 2 mi 2ui 1 mi Su,  Sa 5 eI ai di / eI  di, and
 eI 1 2 ai 2 1Ai 2 Sa 2 1 1 2 mi 2 ui di(3)  Su 5                .  eI 1 2 mi 2 di
Consider the relation between the set of desirable actions induced and each of the social 
norms. When financial incentives are increased, there is an interdependent set of effects on 
action choices and norms. First, the level of desirable action chosen by the agents increases. 
Second, the social norm for the desirable action increases, which follows directly from the defi-
nition of the social norm for the desirable action. Third, it follows from (3) that the social norm 
for the undesirable action decreases when the social norm for the desirable action increases. This 
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relation arises because more undesirable action is induced by the increased financial incentives. 
The increase in undesirable action, in turn, erodes the social norm that discourages the undesir-
able action. Hence, motivating the agents to increase the level of the desirable action necessarily 
leads them to supply more of the undesirable action and also erodes the social norm thwarting 
the undesirable action.
IV.  Organizational Boundaries
Economic entities often include individuals who specialize in different productive activities 
(e.g., auditing and consulting, or sales and service). If the returns to desirable actions across 
productive actions differ, it is preferable to induce higher levels of desirable action from some 
individuals than from others. Section III established that the cost of implementing a level of 
desirable action from an individual is a function of the social norm faced by that individual 
which is, in turn, a function of the behavior of others in the same organization. By managing 
the boundaries of each agent’s organization, then, it is possible to alter the implementation cost 
of a given set of desirable actions.8 In this section, a simple example highlights factors that may 
induce organizations to combine or subdivide so as to alter social norms and thereby lower 
implementation costs.
Assume a set of identical agents indexed on 30, 4 are to be employed. All agents have the same 
behavioral traits: Ai 5 A, ai 5 a, ui 5 u, and mi 5 m for i [ 30, 4 . A high level of the desir-
able action, ah, is required for a proportion d [ 10, 2 of the agents, and a lower level, al , ah, is 
required from the remaining agents. The former opportunity might be thought of as a new line of 
business with growth prospects and the latter as a mature line of business. Throughout our analy-
sis, we assume that these actions are independent of organizational structure. Hence, our analysis 
is concerned with identifying the least costly structure for a given set of desirable actions.
To demonstrate how organizational boundaries matter, consider two possible cases. In the first 
case, all agents work in the same organization, so the social norm is computed over all agents. 
In the second case, there are two organizations, each with its own social norm. One organization 
implements al from each agent and employs proportion  2 d of the agents. The other organiza-
tion implements ah from each agent and employs the remaining agents.
Two sources of cost must be considered when comparing the costs associated with single and 
separate organizations: the costs of compensating the agents, and the costs of undesirable actions 
incurred by the principal. We assume that these latter costs increase linearly in the per capita 
level of the undesirable action. Parameters kh and kl denote the unit costs to the principal of the 
undesirable actions by the agents producing ah and al, respectively. We assume these costs, too, 
are independent of organizational structure. Given the specific additional assumptions in this 
section, the single-organization implementation cost is
(4) C 5 v 1 d 3 f 1ah 2 Naˆ2 1 f 1uˆ h 1 Nuˆ2 1 kh uˆ h 4
 1 1 2 d 2 3 f 1al 2 Naˆ2 1 f 1uˆ l 1 Nuˆ2 1 kl uˆ l 4 , 
where uˆ j denotes the undesirable action of the agents who implement aj when there is a single 
organization, and Naˆ 5 1 2 a 2 A 1 a 3dah 1 1 2 d 2 al 4 and Nuˆ 5 1 2 m 2 u 2 m 3duˆ h 1 1 2 d 2 uˆ l 4 
8 One approach to creating organization boundaries is to create separate firms. A more subtle approach that may 
introduce boundaries within a firm involves putting physical or social distance between employees engaging in differ-
ent tasks.
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are, respectively, the norms associated with the desirable and undesirable actions in the single 
organization. The two-organization implementation cost is
() C 5 v 1 d 3 f 1ah 2 Nah 2 1 f 1uh 1 Nuh 2 1 kh u h 4
 1 1 2 d 2 3 f 1al 2 Nal 2 1 f 1ul 1 Nul 2 1 kl u l 4 , 
where uj denotes the undesirable action of the agents who implement aj when there are two 
organizations, and Nah 5 1 2 a 2 A 1 aah, Nuh 5 1 2 m 2 u2 muh, Nal 5 1 2 a 2 A 1 aal, and 
Nul 5 1 2 m 2u 2 mul are the norms on desirable and undesirable actions associated with the 
implementing ah and al, respectively, in separate organizations.
A. Cost Comparison
Compare first the compensation costs across the one- and two-organization structures, given 
in (4) and (), which exclude the terms involving kh or kl. With separate organizations, neither 
agent type influences the other type, so the desirable action social norm and the agent’s desirable 
action choice coincide: Sah 5 ah and Sal 5 al.
9 In contrast, with a single organization, there is a 
common desirable action social norm, Saˆ , which is between the levels of action implemented for 
the two agent types: al , Saˆ 5 dah 1 1 2 d 2 al , ah. Therefore, the norm faced by an agent in 
a single organization Naˆ satisfies Nal , Naˆ , Nah. Relative to the case with separate organiza-
tions, it follows that agents who implement ah in a single organization incur higher costs of the 
desirable action because the desirable action social norm is intermediate (rather than high), while 
agents who implement al incur a lower cost because the norm is intermediate (rather than low).
Assessing the difference in costs incurred by the agents for the undesirable action is more 
complicated because the undesirable action social norm and the undesirable action choices 
themselves differ across the organization structures.0 Lemma  guarantees that ai 2 Nai 5 ui 1 
Nui, which simplifies matters because agents’ costs for the undesirable action are identical to their 
costs for the desirable action. This observation, coupled with the discussion of costs for desir-
able actions above, implies that agents implementing ah incur lower costs for undesirable actions 
in separate organizations, while the agents implementing al incur higher costs for undesirable 
actions in separate organizations.
Relative to the case with separate organizations, the convexity of the cost function, f, implies 
that the higher costs incurred by the agents implementing ah in a single organization exceed the 
lower costs faced by the agents implementing al. Consequently, separate organizations minimize 
the total compensation costs.
Having established that separate organizations minimize the compensation costs, consider 
next the principal’s total costs, which also include the direct cost from the agents’ undesirable 
actions. The organization structure that minimizes the direct costs is the one that minimizes the 
undesirable action for the type of agent that generates the greatest cost per unit of undesirable 
action. Hence, which structure is best depends on the agents’ relative sensitivities to the social 
norms, a and m, as well as the cost parameters kh and kl.
When the agents are more sensitive to social norms for the undesirable action, m . a, behavior 
is primarily managed through the social norm for undesirable action. If the agents implementing 
al impose the higher cost per unit of undesirable action, kl . kh, the direct cost of undesirable 
action is minimized by having separate organizations because the social norm thwarting the 
undesirable action faced by the agents implementing al is higher with separate organizations. 
9 Similarly, for the undesirable action: Suh 5 2 uh and Sul 5 2ul.0 In general, uh Z uˆh and ul Z uˆl. It can be shown that Nuh , Nuˆ  , Nul for m . 0.
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Among agents implementing al in a separate organization, the social norm for the undesirable 
action is separate from, and so undiminished by, the negative influence of the agents implement-
ing ah, who naturally take more undesirable action. If the cost of undesirable action is greater for 
the agents implementing ah, then a single organization minimizes costs because the undesirable 
action social norm faced by the agents implementing ah is higher due to the positive influence of 
agents implementing al.
When the agents are more sensitive to the social norm for the desirable action, a . m, simi-
lar reasoning applies, although the outcome of that reasoning is different. In the case where the 
agents implementing al generate a higher cost per unit of undesirable action, a single organization 
minimizes the cost of undesirable action because of the positive influence that the agents imple-
menting ah exert on the desirable action social norm faced by the agents implementing al. When 
the agents implementing ah generate a higher cost per unit of undesirable action, separate organi-
zations minimize the costs of undesirable actions because the agents implementing al do not have 
a negative influence on the social norm for the desirable action of the agents implementing ah.
Proposition  summarizes the combined effects of the two sources of cost.
PROPOSITION : Assume that the agents are identical and that the principal seeks to induce 
some proportion d of these agents to implement a high level of the desirable action, ah, and the 
remainder to implement a low level of the desirable action, al , ah. the cost of inducing these 
actions are lower if the agents assigned to produce ah are in a separate organization from the 
agents assigned to produce al, if and only if: (i) the agents are more sensitive to the social norm 
for the desirable action, that is a . m, and kh 2 kl is sufficiently large; (ii) the agents are more 
sensitive to the social norm for the undesirable action, that is, m . a, and kh 2 kl is sufficiently 
small; or (iii) the agents are equally sensitive to each social norm, a 5 m . 0.
B. discussion
The case where the social norm for the undesirable action is more important to the deter-
mination of action choices offers a perspective on public accounting firms that provide both 
consulting and auditing services. In such a professional services firm, the revenues secured by 
a partner are a primary performance measure for that partner. A consequence of employing 
revenue as a performance measure, however, is that each partner has incentives to set aside his 
own professional judgment and appease client management to secure revenues from that client. 
Furthermore, like the undesirable action in our model, appeasement is controlled to some extent 
by a social norm for adhering to high professional standards.
Prominent commentators allege that there is a costly erosion of norms for auditors when a 
public accounting firm provides both consulting and auditing services. For example, Arthur R. 
Wyatt (003, 7), formerly a senior partner and Managing Director–Accounting Principles at 
Arthur Andersen (a once prominent but now defunct public accounting firm), emphasizes this 
erosion in his account of the firm’s collapse: “The infusion of new personnel, some at relatively 
high levels, who lacked a background that placed prominence on accounting professionalism 
gradually gained increasing influence in accounting firms. … Staff personnel within the firms 
were easily able to observe the attributes of those who were the rapidly rising stars and undertook 
efforts to emulate these attributes. … [K]eeping the client happy and doing what was necessary 
to retain the client achieved a prominence that did not exist prior to the advent of the successful 
consulting arms with the firms. The core values of the professional firm were undermined by 
primarily commercial interests.”
 See also Levitt (000).
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We can frame Wyatt’s allegation in the context of the model by contrasting the costs of an 
auditor and a consultant appeasing a client. Appeasement in an audit engagement can result in 
the significant reputation and legal costs associated with an audit failure. Appeasement in a con-
sulting engagement can result in the costs of a botched consulting assignment, which are likely 
to be much lower than those of an audit failure (i.e., the k for auditing exceeds the k for consult-
ing). Proposition  suggests that, if the incentives provided to consultants are more powerful than 
those provided to auditors, splitting the firm into two organizations, audit and consulting, may be 
valuable because doing so preserves a high social norm among auditors.
The benefit of dividing an organization to preserve norms must be weighed against the syn-
ergistic gains from combining in a single organization agents assigned to different tasks. For 
example, synergies arise when auditors sell their firm’s consulting services to their audit clients. 
If the synergies are so large that splitting up the organization is inefficient, then organizations 
might adapt in other ways to preserve social norms. For instance, in firms combining auditing 
and consulting services, the incentives for consultants may be weaker than those in a consult-
ing-only firm, because weaker incentives 1 i.e., lower bi’s 2 imply that lower levels of the desirable 
and undesirable actions are chosen by consultants. In turn, this leads to a higher social norm for 
the undesirable action in the firm, which induces a lower level of the undesirable action from the 
auditors. As another alternative, when norms are low, it becomes worthwhile to install additional 
control systems. For instance, firms that combine consulting and auditing may implement more 
extensive reviews of audit files by partners charged with quality control.
A related set of considerations follows from relaxing the assumption that the direct costs to 
the principal of the undesirable actions are independent of the organizational structure. In par-
ticular, one might suspect that misconduct in one branch of a multiservice firm would adversely 
affect the entire brand and not just the branch where it occurred, suggesting that kh and kl might 
both be larger in a single organization. If so, incentives would be lower in larger organizations, 
ceteris paribus.
V.  Implementation Costs and Behavioral Traits
Research in social psychology suggests that individuals differ in how much they are influ-
enced by a social, as opposed to a personal, norm. If individuals differ in their sensitivities to 
social norms, two questions naturally arise. First, what type of individuals will an organization 
prefer—those who are more sensitive to a social norm or those who are less sensitive? Second, 
will an organization naturally attract the individuals with the preferred trait?
A. Which Behavioral trait Is preferred?
To assess which behavioral trait is preferred, assume the behavioral parameters are the same 
for every agent: ai 5 a, mi 5 m, Ai 5 A, and ui 5 u for all i [ I. Further, assume all agents are 
assigned to the same organization and induced to undertake the same level of desirable action. 
Given the assumption of interior choices for both actions, it follows from () and (3) that the 
per capita cost of inducing action a in the organization is
 1a 2 A2 1 2 a 2
(6)  C 1a 2 5 v 1  f 1 1a 2 A2 1 1 a 2 2 1 k c        2 ud .
  2 m
 See, for example, Kohlberg (984) and Denis Arnold and Lawrence A. Ponemon (99).
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PROPOSITION : Assume identical agents who make a desirable action choice and an undesir-
able action choice. If a is low, then the cost of implementing a for all agents in the organization 
is increasing (decreasing) as the agents become more sensitive to the social norms for the desir-
able (undesirable) action: for a , A, dC 1a 2/da . 0 and dC 1a 2/dm , 0. If a is high, then the 
converse is true: for a . A, dC 1a 2/da , 0 and dC 1a 2/dm . 0.
The intuition underlying Proposition  stems directly from the observation that the principal is 
better off when the agents face higher norms 1 i.e., higher Na and Nu 2 . Given the relation between 
norms and implementation costs, establishing the relation between the sensitivity to social norms 
and implementation costs directly follows from the relation between the sensitivity to the social 
norms and the norms faced by each agent. Consider, first, the agents’ sensitivity to the norm for 
the desirable action. When a . A, the social norm for the desirable action, Sa 5 a, is greater 
than the personal norm for the desirable action, A. Hence, the norm for the desirable action is 
increasing in the sensitivity to the social norm for the desirable action, which implies that the 
implementation costs are reduced when agents are more sensitive to the social norm for the desir-
able action. The converse is true when a , A.
Consider, next, the agents’ sensitivities to the norm for the undesirable action. When a . A, the 
social norm for the undesirable action, Su 5 2u, is less than the personal norm for the undesir-
able action, u. The social norm is less than the personal norm because the higher level of desir-
able action requires incentives that are so strong that agents are induced to undertake a level of 
undesirable action in excess of their personal norm for the undesirable action. Because the social 
norm is less than the personal norm, the norm for the undesirable action is decreasing in the sen-
sitivity to the underlying social norm. As a consequence, implementation costs are increasing in 
the sensitivity to the social norm for the undesirable action. The opposite is true when a , A.
B. Will Agents Self-Select?
Having identified the agent traits the principal values, the second question raised earlier can 
be addressed: when agent characteristics are not observable, will the principal be able to attract 
the agents with the desired traits to the organization? To develop some insight, we consider a 
simple setting, which we call the example setting. Assume half the agents are more sensitive to 
one of the two social norms and the other half are less sensitive to that social norm. The agents 
are otherwise identical. The principal forms an organization that will hire only half the agents 
and induce action a from each of them. We consider two possible cases, one where agents differ 
only in their sensitivity to the desirable action social norm and the other where they differ only 
in their sensitivity to the undesirable action social norm. For each case, we assess whether the 
principal can attract only the agents with the preferred sensitivity to the social norm.
Consider first the case where agents differ only in their sensitivity to the social norm for the 
desirable action. Proposition  implies that the principal strictly prefers to hire agents with a 
low sensitivity to the social norm for the desirable action if a is less than the common personal 
norm for the desirable action A. Proposition  further implies that the principal strictly prefers 
to hire agents with the high sensitivity to the social norm for the desirable action when a . A. 
Observation  implies that the principal attracts exactly those agents when type is not observable 
by offering the same contract as is optimal to offer when type is observable.
OBSERVATION : When agents must self-select in the example setting and the agents differ 
only in their sensitivity to the social norm for the desirable action, the optimal contract offered 
to the desired agent types in the setting where types are observable is accepted only by the 
desired agent types in the setting where types are unobservable.
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Self-selection works in the principal’s interest in this case because the principal’s and agents’ 
interests are aligned. The principal wants to attract agents who can deliver desirable action at 
the lowest cost, and the agent types naturally attracted to the organization are those who can 
increase the performance measure at the lowest cost. When agents differ only in their sensitivity 
to the social norm for the desirable action, the agents who deliver desirable action at the lowest 
cost also deliver the performance measure at the lowest cost, so the most suitable agents are natu-
rally attracted to the organization. Hence, the principal attracts the agents who are best suited to 
the task without incurring adverse selection costs.
Consider, next, the case where the agents differ only in their sensitivity to the social norm for 
the undesirable action. In this case, Proposition  implies that the principal strictly prefers to hire 
agents with a high sensitivity to the social norm when a , A and the agents with a low sensitivity 
when a . A. Observation  suggests that adverse selection problems are insurmountable when 
there are unobserved differences in the sensitivity to social norms for undesirable actions.
OBSERVATION : When agents must self-select in the example setting and the agents differ 
only in their sensitivity to the social norm for the undesirable action, there does not exist a 
contract that attracts only the desired agent type and induces them to take the level of desirable 
action a for any a Z A.
The self-selection problem arises in this case because the interests of the principal and agents 
are not aligned. Recall that the principal wants to attract agents who can deliver desirable action 
at the lowest cost, and agents naturally attracted to the organization are those who can increase 
the performance measure at the lowest cost. When agents differ only in their sensitivity to the 
social norm for the undesirable action, the principal wants those agents who have the highest 
norm for the undesirable action, which are those who are most sensitive to the social norm for 
the undesirable action when a , A and those who are least sensitive to that social norm when a . 
A. In contrast, the agents who can generate the performance measure at the lowest cost are those 
with the lowest norm for the undesirable action. Hence, the principal’s and agents’ interests are 
not aligned and the principal always attracts the least suitable agents.
At a general level, these observations lead to predictions that particular organizations are 
likely to attract agents with particular sensitivities to social norms, which in turn leads to differ-
ences in individual norms of behavior across (as opposed to within) organizations. If a profession 
such as public accountancy or law is viewed as an organization, this implication is consistent 
with the evidence in Ponemon and David R. L. Gabhart (994) that individuals’ sensitivities to 
norms vary systematically across professions. Furthermore, the existence of different norms at 
different firms is consistent with survey findings in William J. Bruns and Kenneth A. Merchant, 
Jr. (990), who document a wide range of attitudes toward various types of undesirable earn-
ings management activities across firms. In addition to providing a model that is consistent with 
this evidence, our analysis yields the additional prediction that the power of financial incentives 
should be related to the average sensitivity to social norms for individuals within an organization, 
as well as the norms that emerge. For example, individuals at firms with high-powered incentives 
are predicted to be more sensitive to norms of behavior regarding earnings management and to 
exhibit lower norms of behavior (i.e., a higher tolerance) for earnings management.
C. personal Norms
We have focused our analysis on differences in agents’ sensitivities to social norms because 
they have been measured and studied by social psychologists. Nonetheless, we also point out 
that issues of self-selection are likely to arise when agents have different personal norms 1 i.e., 
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Ai Z Aj and ui Z uj for some agents i and j 2 . The principal always prefers agents with higher 
personal norms pertaining to both the desirable and undesirable actions because higher norms 
promote the desirable action and thwart the undesirable action. Paralleling the discussion above, 
when agents differ only in their personal norms for the desirable action in the example setting, 
it can be shown that there is no costly adverse selection problem when type is not observable. In 
contrast, when agents differ only in their personal norms for the undesirable action in the exam-
ple setting, there is a costly adverse selection problem when type is not observable. In particular, 
the principal attracts agents with a low personal norm whenever agents with a high personal 
norm are attracted. Hence, self-selection again works in favor of the principal when there are 
differences only in the norms for the desirable action, but works against the principal when there 
are differences in the norms for the undesirable actions.
VI.  Summary and Conclusion
We consider some implications of endogenous social norms for organizational design by ana-
lyzing a model in which a principal employs a continuum of agents who each choose two actions, 
a desirable action that is beneficial to the principal and an undesirable action that is costly to the 
principal. Each agent chooses a mix of these actions because both favorably affect the perfor-
mance measure used for contracting with that agent. The critical aspect of social norms in our 
model is that an agent’s behavior is influenced by the behavior of others in his organization. In 
particular, the cost of an action to an agent is reduced as other agents in the same organization 
engage in more of that action. Although it would be interesting to examine a setting in which 
some agents have a disproportionate influence on norms, for example, highly visible leaders such 
as politicians or CEOs who set the “tone at the top” of an organization, our analysis focuses on 
the role of social norms in settings where no individual agent has a measurable impact on the 
social norm, but the social norm is nevertheless endogenous and influences the action choice of 
every agent.
Our analysis suggests that social norms influence three aspects of organization design: the 
financial incentives provided to members of an organization, the boundaries of an organization, 
and the types of agents in an organization. Social norms create multiplier effects associated with 
changes in the power of financial incentives. Specifically, the effect of an increase in the power 
of financial incentives on the desirable action is multiplied by the presence of a social norm for 
the desirable action and reduced by the presence of a social norm for the undesirable action. It 
follows that an increase in financial incentives may lead to larger or smaller changes than would 
arise in the absence of norm considerations. Therefore, norms should influence the power of 
financial incentives within an organization.
We demonstrate in a simple setting how it can be optimal to split an organization into two 
separate organizations in order to eliminate the externalities the agents with high-powered 
incentives create for those agents with low-powered incentives, and vice versa. These consider-
ations emerge in ongoing debates such as whether accounting firms should provide both auditing 
and consulting services. More generally, our analysis suggests that an organization’s boundaries 
should be chosen in light of the norms those boundaries engender.
A last aspect of organization design that is likely to be influenced by the presence of social 
norms is the types of agents that an organization attracts. Social psychology research suggests 
that individuals differ in their sensitivities to social norms. Given such differences in individual 
behavioral traits, two questions naturally arise: What behavioral traits does an organization pre-
fer? And, can an organization attract the individuals with those traits? When agents differ in 
their sensitivities to social norms for desirable actions, agents who are more sensitive to those 
norms are preferred when high-powered incentives are employed (i.e., when the level of desirable 
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action is high) because these agents incur the lowest cost for taking the desirable action. In con-
trast, agents who are less sensitive to the norm are preferred when low-powered incentives are 
employed. Furthermore, agents with the desired trait are matched naturally to an organization 
because the principal seeks agents with the lowest personal cost for the desirable action, and 
the agents with the lowest cost of the desirable action are attracted naturally to the organization 
because they can generate performance at the lowest personal cost.
When agents differ in their sensitivities to social norms for undesirable actions, agents who 
are less sensitive to those norms are preferred when high-powered incentives are employed (i.e., 
when the level of desirable action is high) because these agents incur the highest cost for taking 
the costly undesirable action. In contrast, agents who are more sensitive to the norm are preferred 
when low-powered incentives are employed. Unlike the case where agents differ in their sensi-
tivities to social norms for the desirable action, agents with the preferred trait do not self-select 
into the organization because the principal seeks the agents with the highest personal cost for the 
undesirable action, while the agents with the lowest personal cost for the undesirable action can 
generate performance at the lowest personal cost.
Because the norms affecting undesirable actions and desirable actions can have different 
implications, determining the social norm to which agents are most sensitive is key to assessing 
how norms influence organizational design choices. We conjecture that norms for undesirable 
actions are likely to be more important in settings where other barriers to performance measure 
manipulation are weak or absent. For example, within the context of a firm, we expect that norms 
relating to undesirable actions are relatively more important when the firm’s other monitoring 
mechanisms, such as an active independent board, are weak; when the firm engages in transac-
tions where the accounting is complex and requires significant subjective estimates; and when 
the firm has significant leverage over its suppliers and customers, which makes it easier to col-
lude with them to manipulate financial reports.
We have restricted our attention to the implications of social norms for organization design. 
Social norm considerations, however, are relevant to other issues of economic interest such as 
understanding how technological changes undermine the legal system and codes of ethical 
behavior (i.e., standards of professional conduct and student honor codes that social norms sup-
port). For example, the development of the Internet and the digitization of copyrighted materials 
have facilitated the undesirable acts of copyright violation via music file sharing and plagiarism, 
not only by making such acts physically easier, but also by eroding the social norms that discour-
aged such acts. Accordingly, exploring the roles played by social norms should provide useful 
insights in other areas of economic research.
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